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0. Introduction 
Before a human being begins to make decisions 
and take unsupervised actions in a professional 
capacity which significantly affect others, s/he is 
usually explicitly empowered to do so, by means of 
some socially and/or legally sanctioned process of 
training and evaluation. 
At a time when it is being suggested that 
computational artifacts may take up roles with 
significant human impact, ranging from medical 
diagnosis to automatic launch on warning of nuclear 
missiles, it becomes appropriate to ask whether 
sufficient thought has been given to the question of 
establishing empowerment processes for such systems 
if they are to act autonomously without human 
supervision. 
I believe that a careful and responsible 
investigation of this question wil l lead to a paradox -
that the sorts of special-purpose, focussed systems 
which we can imagine being within reach technically 
wil l be manifestly and necessarily incapable of 
satisfying certain necessary criteria for empowerment, 
despite our inability to objectively define such criteria 
or design explicit tests to implement them. And this 
inability wil l in turn frustrate us if in the 
unforeseeably distant future we are finally in a 
position to build general-purpose, broadly intelligent 
systems*. 
In what follows I consider first the proximate form 
of the paradox, as it applies to special-purpose 
systems, and then the longer term, more general case. 
The treatment is, given the constraints of space, time 
and the author's expertise, necessarily incomplete and 
anecdotal, rather than exhaustive and authoritative, 
but may at least serve to provoke debate. 
1. Empowering Special-purpose Automatic 
Decision-Making Systems 
In this section I am concerned with the kind of 
systems some at least among us appear to consider 
imminent - fully autonomous active decision-making 
*I start from the assumption that no aspect of human 
intelligence and behaviour is in principle 
unachievable by a humanly constructed artifact. How 
long we shall have to wait for such artifacts, and 
whether their construction wil l incorporate any 
interesting insight into the mind, as opposed to the 
brain, are questions beyond the scope of this paper. 
systems designed for specific, fairly narrowly 
constrained tasks. In the near term we might imagine 
such systems arising by the closing of a 
sense-determine-act loop which to date still includes a 
human link, as in existing nuclear power reactor 
control systems, experimental disease diagnosis and 
treatment systems, and nuclear weapons command 
and control systems, the exact degree of automation of 
which we are not informed of. Or looking further 
ahead one might anticipate the automation of 
functions so far un-mechanised, ranging from bus 
driving to the administration of civil and criminal 
justice. I contend that no such systems should ever be 
empowered to act autonomously, because no test or 
procedure can ever be established which adequately 
establishes their competence. 
1.1 The impossibility in some cases of realistic field 
testing 
For an important subset of potentially empowered 
special-purpose automatic decision-making systems, 
realistic field testing is impossible owing to the 
intolerable cost of failure and/or the impossibility of 
creating the necessary test situation. 
Launch-on-warning systems are the most obvious 
example here, but any system concerned with quick 
response (thus eliminating the possibility of 
last-minute human intervention) to low-probability 
and/or low-frequency events wi l l suffer from the same 
problem, in proportion to the cost of a wrong decision. 
1.2 The inadequacy of testing under simulation 
This problem is pervasive, and indeed defines in 
the end the class of empowerable special-purpose 
systems, namely, those for which exhaustive testing 
under simulation is possible. The problem with 
testing under simulation is that the test necessarily 
recapitulates the categorisation which underlies the 
specification of the system to be tested. Thus it cannot 
validate that categorisation. Even if we suppose that 
some combination of formal means of system 
specification, proofs of system 'correctness' based 
thereon and testing under simulation can (or wi l l some 
day be able to) establish beyond doubt that a system 
implements its specification faithfully, we have sti l l to 
validate that specification. In particular we have to 
validate the choices made in such a specification as to 
the dimensions of description relevant to the 
characterisation of the situations within which the 
system must act. 
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Consider the thermostat - an automatic 
decision-making system long since empowered. We 
are content with that empowerment not only because 
the cost of failure is acceptably low, and because 
physical law and demonstration convince us that, as 
per specification, contact is made or broken as a 
function of ambient temperature, but also because it is 
patent that the dimension of temperature is (almost 
always) the only one relevant to characterising 
situations sufficiently to determine whether they are 
'furnace should be on' or 'furnace should be off. 
1.3 The necessity of general intelligence 
Why is it that one does not have to go far up the 
scale of complexity from thermostats before reaching a 
point where human supervision is uncritically 
assumed to be necessary, whether in existing systems 
such as automatic zero-visibility instrument landing 
systems for aircraft, or experimental diagnosis aids 
such as MYCIN? Not only from fear of system failure, I 
would claim, but also from intuitive appreciation of 
the potential inadequacy of specification. There is 
always a class of doubts expressed as "But what i f . . . " 
which point to a dimension of significance omitted 
from the specification. 
The distinction between a special-purpose system 
and one with general intelligence (e.g. human beings) 
is the ability of the latter to introduce into the 
decision-making process a characterisation of the 
situation along a normally irrelevant dimension. 
Unless one can convincingly demonstrate, as with the 
thermostat, that the dimensions of characterisation 
included in the special-purpose system include all 
those of conceivable relevance, impowerment is clearly 
inappropriate, indeed foolhardy. But for applications 
of sufficient complexity such demonstrations are 
unlikely to be possible. It is worth noting in this 
connection two instances of systems performing to 
specification, but incorrectly: The East Coast power 
failure of 1965 and the BMEWS alert of 1960 caused by 
radar echoes off the rising moon. It would seem, then, 
that any task of sufficient complexity which has an 
appreciable impact on humanity requires at least* 
quasi-human general intelligence to automate it 
safely. 
*This is not to rule out the possibility that there are 
tasks no system can perform. Whether any system, 
human, artifact or hybrid, can rationally be required 
to decide whether or not an enemy missile attack is 
underway and to launch missiles in reply, all within 
eight minutes, seems unlikely at best. On the other 
hand it is clearly a moral and political decision what 
level of risk is tolerable in return for the benefits of 
automation. In the case of the power grid, with 
probability of successful operation reasonably high, 
based on past performance, and cost of failure, 
although high in inconvenience, likely to be low in 
terms of human lives, the risk (the integral of 
probability times cost) is probably worth the benefits. 
In the case of launch-on-warning, with probability of 
failure high, owing to the afore-mentioned 
impossibilities of effective testing, and cost of failure 
enormous, the risk is intolerable. 
I I . Empowering Systems with General Intelligence 
This option is much harder to come to grips with, 
since the construction of artifacts expected to exhibit 
general intelligence seems so much beyond us today. 
None-the-less some useful observations may be made. 
First of all, the paradox alluded to above is now clear-
we may recognise that general intelligence is required 
in a system before it can be empowered to make a wide 
range of decisions autonomously, but how can we 
reliably determine that a candidate for empowerment 
has it? The Turing test in its various forms may be 
adequate in the intellectual or academic spheres, but, 
not to put too fine a point on it, would you bet your life 
on it? The ability to recognise and accomodate to the 
unexpected is almost by definition not susceptible to 
reliable test. It is instructive to consider how this 
issue is dealt with in empowering human beings. 
Interestingly enough to a large extent it isn't. We 
appear to take it for granted, in the established 
processes leading to the empowerment of doctors, 
judges, pilots, nurses, teachers etc, that the candidates 
are possessed of the non-specialist human ability to be 
appropriately sensitive to any and all relevant aspects 
of the context of the decision-making situation. To the 
extent that the question arises, it appears to be 
confronted obliquely and informally, rather that as an 
explicit part of the empowerment process. 
Before confronting the answer to our problem 
which this observation points to, a partial diversion is 
in order, to consider the further criteria for 
empowerment which emerge when we imagine 
perhaps the most extreme possible case, that of a fully 
autonomous empowered decision-making system 
dispensing criminal justice. 
I I . 1 Responsibility and moral sensibility 
It seems to me that before we would consider 
empowering anything to sit in judgement over 
ourselves and our fellows, we would demand above and 
beyond the above-mentioned general intelligence, to 
say nothing of demonstrated legal competence, a 
recognition of the responsibility entailed by the role of 
judge. I am no theorist or philosopher of law, but it 
seems clear to me that despite what we hear about the 
justice system being the rule of law, not of men, we 
none-the-less count on a good judge's humanity to 
temper justice with mercy, to be unavoidably 
influenced by that which s/he shares with those 
brought before him/her. The responsibility which a 
judge bears for his/her decisions influences those 
decisions in a crucial, albeit ineffable, manner. But to 
admit this is to admit as relevant to our concerns the 
question of the nature of 'humanity', considered as a 
quality rather than a tautological property of homo 
sapiens. Now the reason for this diversion into 
matters judicial is I hope clear - determining general 
intelligence is only a sub-part, a rather small part, of 
determining humanity. If we assume rather 
uncritically, on the basis of indirect, subjective 
evidence, the generalised plasticity of intelligence of 
human candidates for empowerment, how much more 
uncritically and implicitly we assume their humanity! 
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II.2 The only reliable test for humanity 
In the end, then, I am led to suggest that the only 
test we could ever sensibly trust before empowering an 
automatic decision-making system is the one we 
subject human beings to: they wi l l have to pass as 
human in the course of ordinary life. The test for 
humanity is being able to successfully participate in 
the human form of life, to convincingly da-sein. 
HI.Conclusions: On Spirituality and Hybrid Systems 
One thing that follows from the preceding line of 
argument is that the current disinclination, to put it 
mildly, of Artif icial Intelligence and Cognitive Science 
to treat the spiritual side of human nature seriously is 
a grave mistake. For if recognition of responsibility 
arising from moral sensibility has a causal role to play 
in human decision making and human behaviour 
more generally, then the origin of moral sensibility in 
man's spirituality becomes a necessary subject of 
study. The fact that concern with the twin questions of 
Why is there something rather than nothing' and 
'How ought I to live my life' is symptomatic of the 
human condition is of as much ultimate significance to 
theories of mind as are the nature of syllogistic 
reasoning or mental representations of grammar, and 
it may be that postponing an investigation of the 
essense of spirituality in favour of the current 
exclusive investigation of the essense of rationality 
may render the whole enterprise literally incoherent. 
On a more practical note, if one concludes from the 
first section that for the foreseeable future in all 
systems of any consequence we must keep people in 
the loop, our problems don't disappear. Keeping 
people in the loop - building hybrid systems - is not as 
easy as it sounds, either to require or to do. If the 
human participation in a hybrid system is reduced to 
pushing a button in response to a light, no useful 
supervision has been accomplished. And how to 
design a genuinely hybrid system which does provide 
effective supervision is an open question. The 
experience of the Three Mile Island disaster suggests 
the we are a long way from being able to build systems 
which effectively integrate human beings' general 
intelligence with computers' special-purpose expertise 
to produce an ensemble capable of flexible and 
informed responses in high-pressure situations. 
If the air of this talk has seemed overly dour and 
pessimistic, I think this is a necessary antidote to the 
facile optimism of too many of our more visible 
representatives in the media. It is our responsibility, 
as scientists and as human beings, to do our best to see 
that such optimism is balanced by an informed and 
skeptical realism before the inevitable social (and 
mortal) cost has to be paid. 
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